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We introduce a deontic action logic and its axiomatization. This logic has some useful
properties (soundness, completeness, compactness and decidability), extending the properties
usually associated with such logics. Though the propositional version of the logic is quite
expressive, we augment it with temporal operators, and we outline an axiomatic system
for this more expressive framework. An important characteristic of this deontic action logic
is that we use boolean combinators on actions, and, because of ﬁniteness restrictions, the
generated boolean algebra is atomic, which is a crucial point in proving the completeness
of the axiomatic system. As our main goal is to use this logic for reasoning about fault-
tolerant systems, we provide a complete example of a simple application, with an attempt
at formalization of some concepts usually associated with fault-tolerance.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In recent years deontic logics (see [26] for an introduction) have generated increasing amounts of interest among com-
puter scientists. This is mainly because this variant of logic allows us to deal with the notions of obligation, permission and
violation, and, more generally, norms, which arise naturally in (almost) all the ﬁelds of computing.
In this paper we introduce our own version of dynamic deontic logic, with the purpose in mind of using it for specifying
(and reasoning about) fault-tolerant programs or systems. We have presented a preliminary version of the logic in [5] and [4],
and here we go into details about the formalism and we show a detailed example of its application in practice. The logic has
some innovative features, as compared to extant versions of deontic logic. For example, because we want to do various forms
of automated analysis of speciﬁcations, such as model checking, we want our logic to have appropriate meta properties. So,
our logic is not just sound and complete, but also decidable and compact (strongly complete). This is an improvement
on the corresponding logic developed by Broersen [3]. This is achieved by means of a number of interesting features. For
example, although the idea of distinguishing weak and strong versions of the permission operator were suggested earlier, our
formulation enables us to interrelate them in a new and novel manner. The two versions of permission have an existential
and universal character, asserting that there is some context for doing an action from the present state, for weak permission,
and that every context for doing that action from the present state is allowed, for strong permission, respectively. This notion
of “context” for actions is captured by using the semantics proposed in [19], interpreting an action as the set of events in
which the action “participates”. This also supports our adoption of an open semantics for our speciﬁcations (see [1]), in
which the environment of the system we are describing may be performing actions in parallel with the system. See [12]
for an extensive discussion of such open semantics; as in the referenced work, we will eventually want to adopt the idea
of specifying system behavior in parts, in terms of components, and then to combine such components, thus making more
concrete the environment for each component in the combination.
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operator (do something other than the referenced action), interpreting it locally in the state in which the complement is
evaluated, instead of globally with respect to all possible actions built from available atomic actions and combinators. These
features allow us to characterize the domain of actions, built from basic actions and combinators, as an atomic boolean
algebra [31]. It is this characterization that leads to the nice meta properties of the logic that we obtain.
The formal framework deﬁned in the following sections has been inﬂuenced by various past ideas; for example, the
obligation operator (and its properties) are similar to those deﬁned in [19] and [20]. We are interested in using techniques
like model checking with our logic, which implies that some properties, such as decidability, are required. Moreover, for
expressing properties inherent to fault-tolerance, we need to be able to express temporal assertions, recovery actions, and
permission and obligation predicates on actions. The temporal extension of the logic uses some concepts from [23], in par-
ticular the given semantics using traces. Finally, the weak permission operator (see the next section) has similar properties
to that deﬁned in [25], though its relationship with the normal, so-called strong permission, is new. We shall compare our
work with these frameworks at various points in what follows. However, note that some novel properties of the deontic op-
erators will be given (e.g., axiom A13 below), and the deﬁnition of obligation given in Section 2 is slightly, but signiﬁcantly,
different from those in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic deﬁnitions of the logic, including its syntax and
semantics. In Section 4 a deductive system is described, and then we prove some meta-theorems of the logic. In Section 5
we extend the propositional system with temporal notions, and we propose an axiomatic system for this new logical system.
Finally, we provide an example of the application of the logic, proving some properties of the speciﬁcation described there.
2. Concocting a Deontic Propositional Logic (DPL)
As usual, we start deﬁning a propositional version of deontic logic (we will call it DPL) by introducing its syntax and se-
mantics. DPL is a modal action logic, which uses boolean operators for combining action terms. Here, we follow the approach
proposed in [18], in the sense that actions are interpreted as a set of “events” (transition labels).
After deﬁning the key components of DPL, we present an axiomatic system which has some similarities to those given
for Dynamic Propositional Logic [25] and Modal Boolean Logic [14]. Finally, we prove the soundness and completeness of the
resulting system.
Deﬁnition 1 (Language). A language (or vocabulary) for DPL is a tuple: 〈Φ0,0〉, where:
• Φ0 is an enumerable set of propositional letters; we will denote them: p1, p2, . . . .
• 0 is a (ﬁnite) set of primitive actions, denoted by: α1, . . . ,αm .
Using the sets Φ0 and 0, we can deﬁne the set of action terms and formulae of a given language.
Deﬁnition 2 (Action terms). Given a vocabulary 〈Φ0,0〉, we deﬁne the set of action terms (called ) as follows:
• 0 ⊆ .
• ∅,U ∈ .
• If α,β ∈ , then α unionsq β ∈  and α 	 β ∈ .
• If α ∈ , then α ∈ .
• No other expression belongs to .
We use the Greek letters: α,β,γ , . . . for variables over . In a similar way we deﬁne the set of well-formed formulae.
Deﬁnition 3 (Formulae). Given a vocabulary: 〈Φ0,0〉, we deﬁne the set of well-formed formulae (Φ) as follows:
• Φ0 ⊆ Φ .
• 
,⊥ ∈ Φ .
• If α,β ∈  then α =act β ∈ Φ .
• If ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ Φ then ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∈ Φ .
• If ϕ ∈ Φ then ¬ϕ ∈ Φ .
• If ϕ ∈ Φ and α ∈  then 〈α〉ϕ ∈ Φ and [α]ϕ ∈ Φ .
• If α ∈  then P(α) ∈ Φ , Pw(α) ∈ Φ and O(α) ∈ Φ .
• No other expression belongs to Φ .
As usual, we can deﬁne some derived operators:
• φ ∨ψ def⇐⇒ (¬φ) → ψ .
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We call P(−) permission or strong permission, whereas Pw(−) is weak permission; the differences between the two will
become evident with their semantic deﬁnitions. Including both versions of permission gives us some freedom in specifying
systems, and it is interesting that the two operators are related in a strong way, as we show later on.
The obligation operator will be deﬁned using the two versions of permission, instead of taking the usual deﬁnition:
O(α) ≡ ¬Pw(α). We deﬁne (by means of axioms, see below):
O(α) ≡ P(α)∧¬Pw(α).
We will explain this deﬁnition later. Before this, we need to introduce the concept of semantic structures.
Deﬁnition 4 (Structures). Given a language L = 〈Φ0,0〉, an L-structure is a tuple M = 〈W,R,E,I,P〉 where:
• W is a set of worlds.
• R is an E-labeled relation between worlds. We require that, if (w,w ′, e) ∈ R and (w,w ′′, e) ∈ R, then w ′ = w ′′ , i.e.,
R is functional when we ﬁx the third element in the tuple.
• E is a non-empty set of (names of) events.
• I , is a function:
– For every p ∈ Φ0: I(p) ⊆ W .
– For every α ∈ 0: I(α) ⊆ E .
In addition, the interpretation I has to satisfy the following properties:
I.1. For every αi ∈ 0: |I(αi)−⋃{I(α j) | α j ∈ (0 − {αi})}| 1.
I.2. For every e ∈ E : if e ∈ I(αi)∩ I(α j), where αi = α j and α j,αi ∈ 0, then:⋂{I(αk) | αk ∈ 0 ∧ e ∈ I(αk)}= {e}.
I.3. E =⋃αi∈0 I(αi).• P ⊆ W × E , is a relation which indicates which event is permitted in which world.
We can extend the function I to well-formed action terms and formulae, as follows:
• I(¬ϕ) def= W − I(ϕ).
• I(ϕ → ψ) def= I(¬ϕ)∪ I(ψ).
• I(α unionsq β) def= I(α)∪ I(β).
• I(α 	 β) def= I(α)∩ I(β).
• I(α) def= E − I(α).
• I(∅) def= ∅.
• I(U) def= E .
Conditions I.1 and I.2 in Deﬁnition 4 express topological requirements on the possible interpretations of primitive actions.
I.1 says that the isolated application of an action always generates at most one event; otherwise we will have an undesired
nondeterminism in our models, as the different ways of executing a primitive action should arise because you can execute
it together with other actions (perhaps environmental actions). I.2 establishes that if an event is a result of the execution of two
or more actions, then the concurrent execution of all the actions which generate it will give us only this event. This condition also
ensures that a weird nondeterminism will not occur, in the sense that the existence of nondeterminism must be grounded
on the combination of different sets of actions with environmental events; that is, an action can have different behaviors
because several different environment (or system) events may happen during its execution, and this is the only cause of the
action nondeterminism. The reader may suspect the shadow of the mechanism philosophy of [28] being cast here.
As explained in [30], a useful way of thinking about the semantic structures is seeing them as colored Kripke structures,
where a given transition is colored with green if it is allowed, and colored with red otherwise.
Some notation is needed for dealing with the relational part of the structure: we will use the notation w
e→ w ′ when
(w,w ′, e) ∈ R. For a given e ∈ E we deﬁne the relation Re = {(w,w ′) | (w,w ′, e) ∈ R}. Also, given a w ∈ W we deﬁne:
Pw = {e ∈ E | (w, e) ∈ P}. These deﬁnitions will be useful in the following sections. Let us introduce the relation  between
models and formulae.
Deﬁnition 5 (). Given a vocabulary L = 〈Φ0,0〉 and a L-structure M = 〈W,R,E,I,P〉, we deﬁne the relation  between
worlds and formulae as follows:
• w,M  p def⇐⇒ w ∈ I(p).
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• w,M ¬ϕ def⇐⇒ not w  ϕ .
• w,M  ϕ → ψ def⇐⇒ w ¬ϕ or w ψ or both.
• w,M  〈α〉ϕ def⇐⇒ there exists some w ′ ∈ W and e ∈ I(α) such that w e→ w ′ and w ′,M  ϕ .
• w,M  P(α) def⇐⇒ for all e ∈ I(α), P(w, e) holds.
• w,M  Pw(α) def⇐⇒ there exists some e ∈ I(α) such that P(w, e).
We have not deﬁned the box modality and the obligation predicate, because they can be deﬁned by means of the other
operators; see the axiomatic system presented below. As usual, we say that M  ϕ iff for all worlds w ∈ W we have:
w,M  ϕ . And we say:  ϕ , if M  ϕ for all models M . Some intuition about each operator is useful:
• [α]ϕ , after executing α in any possible way, ϕ will hold.
• [α1 unionsq α2]ϕ , every way of executing α1 or α2 leads to ϕ .
• [α]ϕ , after executing an action different from α, ϕ holds.
• [α1 	 α2]ϕ , every way of executing both α1 and α2 leads to ϕ .
• P(α), all the different ways of executing α are allowed.
• Pw(α), there is at least one way of executing α which is allowed.
Note that boolean operators are interpreted on the set of events. Another approach is to interpret each primitive action
as a relation, and then each boolean operator as a relation operator. Here, it is more useful for us to have a set of events
interpreting an action, in particular for the semantics of the permission predicate. Note the symmetric deﬁnitions of strong
and weak permission, reﬂecting a universal/existential symmetry.
Some comments are in order regarding the deﬁnition of obligation. First, note that the permission predicates allow us
to partition the transitions of the semantic structures into “allowed” transitions (or green transitions) and “not-allowed”
transitions (red transitions). For us, an obligatory action is one which is the only one acceptable (i.e., its execution, in any
way, produces a green transition) and the execution of any other action is unwanted (although possible); that is, these
transitions are red colored. This intuition is formalized using both versions of permission, as shown above. The standard
deﬁnition (O(α) ≡ ¬Pw(α)) does not consider obligated actions as allowed (which we think should be the case), and also
enables Ross’s paradox (O(α) → O(α unionsqβ)), note that with our deﬁnition we do not have this paradox. Another option could
be to deﬁne O(α) ≡ Pw(α) ∧ ¬Pw(α), but we reject this deﬁnition because of underspeciﬁcation; i.e., this deﬁnition says
that an obliged action is weakly allowed, and therefore some (no speciﬁed) ways of performing it might be forbidden,
our position is that there must be not missing details when we impose an obligation. For example, if we say: you ought
to press the red button, but pressing the red button together the blue one is forbidden, then, we must express this requirement
by O(press_red 	 press_blue), and not O(press_red), i.e., from our point of view, there must be no implicit conditions when
imposing obligations.
On the other hand, we remark that the obligation introduced above is an immediate obligation, i.e., this operator only
predicates about the next transition. As a consequence of this, an obligation is not necessarily kept through time. We think
that the dynamics of obligations should be imposed by the designers in their speciﬁcations. For example, we can say that,
if an obligation is not fulﬁlled, then we will keep it, with the following formula: O(α) → [α ]O(α). Or we can say that an
obligation to do another action arises (i.e., a contrary to duty obligation) as follows: O(α) → [α ]O(β). The important point
here is that this dynamics depends on the scenario to be formalized. In Section 5 we introduce a temporal extension of the
logic. Using the temporal operators, we can deﬁne temporal notions of obligation, for example: A(O(α) U ϕ), which says
that we are obliged to perform the action α until ϕ becomes true. Several deontic temporal notions can also be developed,
but we do not investigate this topic in this paper.
A comment may be useful about the empty action (∅); it seems that this is a weird action in some sense. In Section 5
we will add temporal semantics to our logics, and it will be possible to prove in all possible models that this action never
happens. In some sense, it is an impossible action. Then, why predicate about whether it is permitted or not? In our logic we
have P(∅) and ¬Pw(∅) (the latter coincides with [25]). From the common sense point of view, this discussion is immaterial;
thus, we choose to allow impossible actions since it gives us completeness of our logic. Note that in our semantics both
P(∅) and ¬Pw(∅) are vacuously true.
3. Related work
Several variants of Modal Action Logic with boolean operators (with and without deontic predicates) can be found in
the literature. On the one hand, the Boolean Modal Logic introduced by Gargov and Passy in [14] does not have deontic
operators, and the complement used in their logic is an absolute one; this is undesirable (in the context of computing
systems) because unreachable worlds become reachable using this operator. Note that the complement deﬁned in this
paper is a relative one; that is, for the complement of an action in the scope of a modality we only take into account the
enabled transitions in the actual world. Broersen (see [3]) proposes some modiﬁcations to the logic of Gargov and Passy,
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there. Another point to note is that, as proved by Broersen in his thesis, boolean modal logics with relative complement
and an inﬁnite number of actions are not compact. The logic presented here is compact (see the next section); this is
because having a ﬁnite set of actions allows us to obtain an atomic algebra, which can be strongly related to the semantics
of the logic (see the completeness proof below). Here it is important to note that the semantics of the action operators
is given by means of an algebra of events, in contrast with the cited works where the action operators are interpreted as
relational operations. Having a ﬁnite set of actions has other meta-theoretical implications, perhaps the most important is
that structurality is lost, i.e., change of notation may affect formula validity (see [16] and [13]), although, perhaps, some
weak versions of structurality may be satisﬁed by this logic (e.g., the weak structurality deﬁned in [11]); we leave the
investigation of meta-properties related with structurality as further work.
Furthermore, the deontic part of the logic also has novel features, and (as explained in the introduction) there exists a
strong relationship between the two versions of the permission operator, which is expressed by the axioms A12 and A13
(see below), and this relationship is important when proving the completeness of the system. Moreover, using the two
versions of permission, we deﬁne the obligation predicate (as explained above). It is important to remark that an important
difference between the logic presented here and dynamic deontic logics ([25] and [3]) is that the deontic operators are
independent of modalities. We follow the philosophy introduced in [20] in the sense that the prescription and description
of systems must be separated concepts. Meyer deﬁnes permission using modalities (e.g., Pw(α) ≡ 〈α〉¬v , for some violation
constant v), but this strong relationship is often not desirable in fault-tolerance; for example, violations not only arise from
execution of forbidden actions, but they could also be carried forward by allowed actions. (Here, it is important to note
the distinction between allowed actions and recovery actions.) Similar arguments are given by Sergot in [30], where the
deontic component of the language nC+ is presented. In this language there exists a weak relationship between violations
and allowed (or forbidden) transitions; only the so-called Green–Green–Green constraint (or ggg for short) is adhered to. In
Sergot’s words: from a green state using a green transition we obtain a green state. We have not included violation constants in
the logic. In fault-tolerance (and in other contexts), a different set of violations, with diverse structure, arise in each scenario,
and, therefore, which violations exist and how they occur must be deﬁned in each speciﬁcation by the designers. (See the
example given in Section 6.) The ggg constraint can be introduced in the logic as a parameterized (language dependent)
logical axiom, i.e., an axiom which must be instantiated for the extra-logical language of each speciﬁcation (similar to the
locality axiom [12]). We leave this for further work, but we note that the characteristics of the logic make it possible to use
it to reason about transition systems described with the language nC+.
Finally, the temporal extension of the logic presented in Section 5 has some similarities to the logic presented in [7]
(where a temporal extension of dynamic deontic logic is described), but note that there are two important differences: ﬁrst,
the logic described there is an ought-to-be logic, i.e., the deontic operators are used on predicates (in contrast, our logic is
an ought-to-do logic, i.e., we use the deontic operators to prescribe actions). Second, the temporal logic described in [7] is
linear, here we introduce a branching time logic (see [9]).
4. A deductive system
In this section we present a (Hilbert style) deductive system; this is a normal modal system (in the sense that the
K-axiom can be deduced from it) and the axioms for the box modalities are similar to those given in [14] and [17]. We say
that  ϕ when ϕ is a theorem of the following axiomatic system (see [2] for the formal deﬁnition). We follow [22] for the
deﬁnition of the relationship  ⊆ ℘(Φ) × Φ , i.e., Γ  ϕ if and only if there exists a sequence of formulae ϕ0, . . . , ϕn such
that ϕn = ϕ and for each ϕi (i < n) either ϕi ∈ Γ , or  ϕi , or there exists ϕk and ϕ j (where k, j < i) such that ϕi is derivable
from ϕ j and ϕk using Modus Ponens. Of course, ∅  ϕ is equivalent to  ϕ . Note that with this deﬁnition of deducibility,
we can only apply the deduction rule GN (see below) to theorems (but we cannot use this rule with assumptions). This
deﬁnition of deduction retains the deduction (meta) theorem, that is: Γ ∪ {ϕ′}  ϕ if and only if Γ  ϕ′ → ϕ , see [22] for
details. We need another version of deduction (which can be thought of as being a global version of deduction) in which
we extend the axiomatic system with additional axioms; we say that S ϕ if we have  ϕ when we add the formulae in S
as axioms in the axiomatic system. Note that in this case we can apply the rule GN to the formulae in the set S .
An important characteristic of our set of axioms (which, to the authors’ knowledge, is not shared with previous works) is
that it establishes a deep connection between the weak version of permission and the strong version of it. Actually, one of
these axioms implies a kind of “compactness” property that our models satisfy; this property is implied by the restrictions
assumed about the two versions of permission. This is a key fact exploited in the completeness proof. Before going into
details, we need to introduce the notions of canonical action terms and boolean algebra of action terms. For the following
deﬁnitions, we consider the following ﬁxed vocabulary:
Φ0 = {p1, p2, . . .}, 0 = {α1, . . . ,αn}.
This language induces the set  of boolean terms (see Deﬁnition 2); we denote by ΦBA some axiomatization of
boolean algebras (note that there exist complete axiomatizations, see [31]). Then, the set /ΦBA is the quotient set
of the boolean terms by =act; the point is that, using this set, we can deﬁne the (atomic) boolean algebra 〈/ΦBA,
unionsq[],	[],−[], [∅]BA, [U ]BA〉 as follows:
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• [α]BA unionsq[] [β]BA = [α unionsq β]BA .
• [α]BA 	[] [β]BA = [α 	 β]BA .
It is straightforward to prove that this is a boolean algebra. Furthermore, since the terms in  are generated by a ﬁnite set
0 of primitive actions, the quotient boolean algebra is ﬁnite, and therefore atomic. We denote by at(/ΦBA) (or at()
when no confusion arises) the set of atoms of the quotient boolean algebra of terms. Note also that we can deﬁne [] in
the usual way.
It will be useful to recall the following theorems about atomic boolean algebras.
Theorem 1. For every ﬁnite boolean algebra 〈A,∪,∩,−,0,1〉, the following holds: for all x ∈ A, there exist atoms a1, . . . ,an such
that: x= a1 ∪ · · · ∪ an.
Proof. See [27]. 
Theorem 2. For every ﬁnite boolean algebra B = 〈A,∪,∩,−,0,1〉, and considering A = {a | a is an atom of B}, there exists an iso-
morphism between B and the boolean algebra 〈℘(A),∪,∩,−,∅,A〉. The isomorphism is deﬁned by f (x) = {a | a x}.
Proof. See [27]. 
A useful corollary of this theorem is:
Corollary 1. Given a boolean algebra B and an element x of B, then x is an atom iff the cardinality of {a | a x and a is an atom} is 1.
Proof. One direction is trivial. The other is straightforward using the fact that f is bijective. 
At this point we are ready to present our axiomatic system.
Deﬁnition 6 (Axioms for DPL). Given a vocabulary 〈Φ0,0〉, where 0 = {α1, . . . ,αn}, the axiomatic system is composed of
the following axioms:
(1) The set of propositional tautologies.
(2) A set of axioms for boolean algebras for action terms (a complete one), including standard axioms for equality.
(3) The following set of axioms:
A1. 〈α〉⊥ ↔ ⊥.
A2. [∅]ϕ .
A3. 〈α〉ϕ ∧ [α]ψ → 〈α〉(ϕ ∧ψ).
A4. [α unionsq α′]ϕ ↔ [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ϕ .
A5. [α]ϕ → [α 	 α′]ϕ .
A6. P(∅).
A7. P(α unionsq β) ↔ P(α)∧ P(β).
A8. P(α)∨ P(β) → P(α 	 β).
A9. ¬Pw(∅).
A10. Pw(α unionsq β) ↔ Pw(α)∨ Pw(β).
A11. Pw(α 	 β) → Pw(α)∧ Pw(β).
A12. P(α)∧ α = ∅ → Pw(α).
A13. Pw(γ ) → P(γ ), where [γ ]BA ∈ at().
A14. O(α) ↔ P(α)∧¬Pw(α).
A15. [α]ϕ ↔ ¬〈α〉¬ϕ .
A16. (α1 unionsq · · · unionsq αn) =act U.
A17. 〈β〉(α =act α′) → α =act α′ .
BA. ϕ[α] ∧ (α =act α′) → ϕ[α/α′].
A18. 〈γ 〉ϕ → [γ ]ϕ , where [γ ]BA ∈ at().
And the following deduction rules:
MP: ϕϕ → ψ
ψ
, GN: ϕ[α]ϕ
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impossible action: after an impossible action everything becomes possible. A4 tells us that if something is true after the execution
of a nondeterministic choice between two actions, then it has to be true after the execution of each one of these actions. A5 says that
parallel execution of actions preserves properties; perhaps one might think of some scenario where this is not true, but this
happens when we execute two actions inconsistent with each other, and this is just an impossible action in our framework.
A6, A7 and A8 are similar axioms for strong permission, and A9, A10 and A11 are the duals for weak permission. Note that
A6 says that the impossible action is strongly permitted in every context, but A9 says that it is not weakly permitted. So
there is no context which allows its execution. It is in this sense that the impossible action can never be executed. The
important point is to establish a relationship between the two versions of permission and axiom A13 expresses an intuitive
connection between strong and weak versions of permission: if an action which can only be executed in one possible context is
weakly allowed, then it is strongly allowed. This axiom implies a kind of compactness property which relates both versions of
permission: “if in every context an action α is weakly permitted, then α is strongly permitted”. Or, by the contrapositive, “if an
action is not strongly allowed, then in some context it is not weakly permitted”.
Note that the (schema) axiom BA uses substitution on formulae: the notation ϕ[α] means that the formula, which the
metavariable ϕ denotes, has an occurrence of the boolean term, which the metavariable α denotes, and we write ϕ[α/α′]
to mean that the term α is replaced in some of its occurrences by the boolean term α′ .
Axiom A16 says that all the possible actions are covered by the choice between all the primitive actions of 0. On the
other hand, axiom A17 is needed to express that modalities do not affect equations (note that the formula α =act β →
[γ ]α =act β can be proven using the properties of equality and axiom BA). Axiom A18 formalizes the requirement that the
transitions must be deterministic with respect to events. (It is important to stress that the action γ in this formula denotes
an atom in the boolean atomic term algebra, which implies that the interpretation of this action term can only have at most
one event.)
Two useful requirements for propositional logics are the soundness and completeness properties; we shall show that the
given axiomatic system has both properties. Although some future extensions of the logic (e.g., the ﬁrst order version) may
not be complete, these two theorems give us enough conﬁdence about the adequacy of the basic system, whose axioms will
remain in future versions.
In [14] and [3], two different complete, and sound, systems are given for the modal part of the logic (that is, action terms
and box modality), but both systems lack deontic concepts, and the complement described in those works is the absolute
one. As explained above, the one described here is a kind of relative complement.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). The axiomatic system deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6 is sound with respect to the models deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4, that
is:
 ϕ ⇒  ϕ
Proof. We have to prove that each axiom is valid, and that the deduction rules preserve validity. We only prove validity of
axiom A13 (axiom A18 can be proven in a similar way), which is the hardest one to prove, as the others are straightforward.
Axiom A13: Note that if [γ ]BA is an atom of the term boolean algebra then, by conditions I.1 and I.2, either I(γ ) = {e} for
some e ∈ E or I(γ ) = ∅, in any case we have that, if w,M  Pw(γ ), then w,M  P(γ ), and then using the deﬁnition of 
we get w,M  Pw(γ ) → P(γ ), for every state w of a given structure M . The result follows. 
Note that axioms A1, A3 and rule GN imply that we have a normal modal logic; a number of useful standard modal logic
properties can be found in [6]; we use some of these standard modal properties during the proofs, and we will use ML to
indicate this.
The following theorems of the axiomatic system deﬁned are used in the completeness proof; actually, in [14], theorem T3
is used for axiomatizing the modal part of boolean logic, and it should be enough for the modal part of our logic. Because
we are taking an algebraic view of the logic, in our axiomatic system we focused on operational properties.
Theorem 4. The following are theorems of DPL,
T1. P(α)∧ α′  α → P(α′).
T2. Pw(α′)∧ α′  α → Pw(α).
T3. [α]ϕ ∧ (α′  α) → [α′]ϕ .
T4. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α unionsq α′](ϕ ∨ψ).
T5. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α 	 α′](ϕ ∧ψ).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Now, we can introduce the following (canonical) model; note that we use the atoms of the boolean term algebra (modulo
boolean equations) as labels in the transitions. In other words, each boolean atom (of the action terms) can be mapped to
one (and only one) event in the model.
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as follows:
• EC def= at(/Γ ′).
• WC def= {Γ | Γ is a maximal consistent set of formulae and Γ ′ ⊆ Γ }.
• RC def= ⋃{Rα,w,w ′ | w,w ′ ∈ WC ∧ α ∈ ∧ ([α]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ w ′)}, where Rα,w,w ′ def= {w [α′]B A→ w ′ | [α′]BA ∈ IC(α)}.
• PC def= ⋃{Pw,α | w ∈ WC ∧ P(α) ∈ w}, where: Pw,α def= {(w, [α′]BA) | [α′]BA ∈ IC(α)}.
• IC(αi) def= {[α′]BA ∈ EC |ΦB A α′  αi}.
• IC(pi) def= {w ∈ WC | pi ∈ w}.
We will use this model to show the completeness of the logic; the usual way to do this is to prove an equivalent result:
each consistent set of formulae has a model. First, we have to establish a number of useful lemmas:
Lemma 1. ∀α ∈ ,∀[α′]BA ∈ IC(α): ΦB A α′  α.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the term α.
Base case
• If α = ∅, then by deﬁnition IC(∅) = ∅ and the statement is vacuously true. Note that we use the symbol ∅ in two
different ways: the ﬁrst one as an action term, and the second one as the empty set.
• If α = αi , then the result is straightforward by deﬁnition of IC .
Inductive case
• Case (α = α′ unionsq α′′): let [γ ]BA ∈ IC(α′ unionsq α′′) be an event; then, by Deﬁnition 7, we have [γ ]BA ∈ IC(α′) ∪ IC(α′′); by
the hypothesis we obtain: ΦB A γ  α′ or ΦB A γ  α′′ , and therefore, by properties of boolean algebras we obtain:ΦB A γ  α′ unionsq α′′ .• Case (α = α′ 	 α′′): similar argument as in the last step.
• Case (α = α′): suppose [γ ]BA ∈ E − IC(α), then BA γ  α; since γ is an atom, by boolean algebra properties we get:
ΦB A γ  α. 
Now, we can prove a fundamental lemma.
Lemma 2 (Truth lemma). w,C  ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ .
Base case. Using the deﬁnition we get
w,C  pi ⇔ w ∈ IC(pi) ⇔ pi ∈ w
Inductive case. We have several cases (the standard logical operators are as usual):
Case I. We have to prove w,C  [α]ϕ ⇔ [α]ϕ ∈ w .
(⇒) Suppose w,C  [α]ϕ; we have two possibilities: w,C  α =act ∅ or w,C  α =act ∅. In the former case we have (by
axiom 2) [α]ϕ ∈ w . If w,C  α =act ∅, then (by deﬁnition of IC ) we have IC(α) = ∅. Now, by hypothesis:
∀[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α),∀w ′ ∈ WC : w [γ ]B A→ w ′ ⇒ w ′,C  ϕ
≡ [inductive hypothesis]
∀[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α),∀w ′ ∈ WC : w [γ ]B A→ w ′ ⇒ ϕ ∈ w ′ (∗)
On the other hand, suppose [α]ϕ /∈ w , then (recalling properties of maximal consistent sets) 〈α〉¬ϕ ∈ w . Now, consider the
set: Γ = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | [α]ψ ∈ w}. We claim that this set is consistent, if not:
∃ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈ Γ : {ψ1, . . . ,ψn,¬ϕ}  ⊥
by deﬁnition of contradiction. But using this we can deduce:
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⇒ [axiom 3 and maximal consistent set properties]
〈α〉(¬ϕ ∧ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn) ∈ w
⇔ [hypothesis]
〈α〉⊥ ∈ w
⇔ [axiom 1]
⊥ ∈ w!
Then Γ has to be consistent, and therefore it has a maximal consistent extension Γ ∗ (by Lindenbaum’s lemma). But by
deﬁnition of RC :
∀[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α): w [γ ]B A→ Γ ∗ ∧ Γ ∗ ¬ϕ
which contradicts (∗) (recall that IC(α) = ∅) and therefore [α]ϕ ∈ w .
(⇐) Suppose [α]ϕ ∈ w; we have to prove w  [α]ϕ . Suppose that w  [α]ϕ , then this means:
∃[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α),∃w ′ ∈ WC : w [γ ]B A→ w ′ ∧ w ′,C  ϕ
which is equivalent to (by ind. hyp.):
∃[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α),∃w ′ ∈ WC : w [γ ]B A→ w ′ ∧ ϕ /∈ w ′ (∗∗)
But, by deﬁnition of RC , this means:
∃w ′ ∈ WC : (∀ψ : [γ ]ψ ∈ w ⇒ ψ ∈ w ′)∧ ϕ /∈ w ′
⇒ [logic]
¬([γ ]ϕ) ∈ w
⇔ [max. cons. set properties]
[γ ]ϕ /∈ w (∗∗∗)
But we know by Lemma 1 that γ  α. From here and using the hypothesis ([α]ϕ ∈ w) and using theorem T3, we obtain:
[γ ]ϕ ∈ w , and therefore: w,C  [α]ϕ .
Case II. We have to prove: w,C  P(α) ⇔ P(α) ∈ w .
(⇒) Suppose w,C  P(α), this means:
∀[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α): PC
(
w, [γ ]B A
)
Because of Lemma 1, this implies (using deﬁnition of PC ) that either P(α) ∈ w or P(β) ∈ w where ΦB A α  β , since there
is no other way to introduce this relation in the canonical model. In both cases the result follows, in the ﬁrst trivially, in
the second one by using T1.
(⇐) Suppose that P(α) ∈ w , by deﬁnition of PC this means:
∀[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α): PC
(
w, [γ ]B A
)
But using the deﬁnition of  we get: w,C  P (α).
Case III. w,C  Pw(α) ⇔ Pw(α) ∈ w .
For the case α =act ∅ the equivalence is trivial; let us prove the other case (α =act ∅).
(⇒) Suppose w,C  Pw(α), this means:
∃[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α): PC
(
w, [γ ]B A
)
By deﬁnition of PC this only happens if for some β: γ  β and P(β) ∈ w . Then by theorem T1 this implies P(γ ) ∈ w , and
therefore, using axiom A12, we get: Pw(γ ) ∈ w; from this, by theorem T2, we obtain Pw(α) ∈ w .
(⇐) Suppose Pw(α) ∈ w . We know by properties of atomic boolean algebras that:
[α]B A = [γ1]B A unionsq[] · · · unionsq[] [γn]B A for some [γ1]B A, . . . , [γn]B A atoms in /ΦB A
⇔ [def. of /ΦB A]
[α] = [γ unionsq · · · unionsq γ ]B A 1 n B A
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Pw(γ1)∨ · · · ∨ Pw(γn) ∈ w
Let γi be some of these action terms such that Pw(γi) ∈ w; since γi ∈ at(), using A13 we get P(γi) ∈ w . By deﬁnition of
PC , this implies that:
∃[γ ]B A ∈ IC(α): PC
([γ ]B A,w)
and this is just the deﬁnition of w,C  Pw(α). 
Note that we have to prove that the deﬁned interpretation IC holds with the restrictions I.1 and I.2 (I.3 is satisﬁed by
deﬁnition). Also we must prove that the transitions in the canonical model are deterministic with respect to events. The
following theorems do this.
Theorem 5. For any w,w ′,w ′′ ∈ WC we have that, if w e→ w ′ and w e→ w ′′ are in RC , then w ′ = w ′′ .
Proof. We know that e = [γ ]BA for some γ ∈ At(/Γ ′), and by axiom A18 we have that w,C  〈γ 〉ϕ → [γ ]ϕ , for every
formula ϕ , this implies that both w ′ and w ′′ satisﬁes the same predicates, and therefore w ′ = w ′′ . 
Theorem 6. The function IC satisﬁes conditions I.1 and I.2.
Proof. First note that all the atoms of the boolean algebra /ΦBA (the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra [31]) have the following
form (or are equivalent to it):
α11 	 · · · 	 α1m 	 α21 	 · · · 	 α2k ,
where for all αi ∈ 0: αi = α1j or αi = α2j , for some j. That is, the atoms in the Lindenbaum algebra can be represented by
terms which are composed of “intersections” of atomic actions or their negations. It is for this reason that the atoms of the
Lindenbaum algebra are suitable for representing labels in the model: each of them point out which primitive actions are
executed and which are not.
That IC satisﬁes conditions I.1 and I.2 is implied by the underlying structure of the generated Lindenbaum Algebra:
I.1: If [γ ] ∈ IC(αi)−⋃ j =i(IC(α j)), then γ =act αi 	 (	j =i(α j )), where	 is used to denote the application of 	 to a ﬁnite
sequence of boolean terms.
I.2: We have to show that, if [γ ] ∈ I(αi)∩ I(α j), for some i = j, then:⋂{I(αk) | [γ ] ∈ I(αk)}= {[γ ]} (1)
In this case it is easy to see that:
γ =act α11 	 · · · 	 α1m 	 α21 	 · · · 	 α2m′ , (2)
where the α1i are the primitive actions which have the equivalence class [γ ] in their interpretation, and the α2i are the rest.
Since the right term in Eq. (2) is an atom, every other [γ ′] that satisﬁes condition (1) also satisﬁes: [γ ′] = [γ ]. The theorem
follows. 
We have proved that the canonical model has the correct behavior; the completeness follows:
Corollary 2. For every consistent set Γ of DPL, there is a model which satisﬁes it.
Proof. If Γ is consistent, then there exists a maximal extension of it which is a maximal consistent set, and therefore
this set is a world w in the canonical model. By the deﬁnition of canonical model we know w,C  Γ ; this completes the
proof. 
From it we obtain compactness:
Corollary 3. If every ﬁnite subset of a set Γ of formulae is satisﬁable, then Γ is satisﬁable.
Decidability can be proved using a selection argument.
Theorem 7 (Decidability). Satisﬁability is decidable in DPL.
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the maximal depth of nested modalities), and let n be the number of primitive actions in the language.
First, note that for every world in M we have at most
∑n
i=1
(n
i
)= 2n − 1 possible relationships with other worlds (that
is, the maximum number of events in the model). Let M ′ be the model obtained from M by ruling out those worlds not
reachable from w in m “steps”. Clearly, M ′,w  ϕ , and M ′ has at most m ∗ (2n − 1) worlds, where m = d(ϕ) and n is the
number of primitive actions.
This gives us a decidability method: given ϕ , build all the models up to size m ∗ (2n − 1) and check if ϕ is true in every
one of them. Obviously, this method is exponential in complexity. 
The following theorems of the axiomatic system deﬁned give us the ﬁrst ﬂavor of it.
Theorem 8. The following sentences are theorems of DPL.
T6. O(α)∧ O(α) ↔ U=act ∅.
T7. O(α)∧ O(β) → O(α 	 β).
T8. P(U) → P(α) for every action α.
T9. Pw(α) → Pw(U) for every action α.
T10. O(U) ↔ P(U).
T11. O(∅) ↔ ¬Pw(U).
T12. O(α) → P(α).
Proof. Straightforward application of the deﬁnition of obligation. 
Properties T6 and T12 are desirable from an intuitive point of view: T6 says that if we are obliged to perform contra-
dictory actions, then every action is impossible. The equation ∅ =act U implies that we have a degenerate boolean algebra.
Though we have the possibility of having the degenerate boolean algebra in our semantics, usually this can be considered as
indicating that our action algebra is inconsistent. T12 says that if an action is obligated, then it is permitted. Note that we do
not have that obligation implies enabledness that is: O(α) → 〈α〉
. This property is correct from some philosophical point
of view (e.g., the Kantian principle that ought implies can), but we do not believe that this is the case in computing sys-
tems: an action can be obligated, but it cannot be executed since it is waiting for some resource (as a consequence perhaps
a violation is produced, or the obligation might be kept through time). In this respect, our deﬁnition of obligation differs
from the one given in [25]. In that framework the Kantian principle is followed. Similarly, we have neither Pw(α) → 〈α〉

nor P(α) → 〈α〉
.
Property T11 is strange at ﬁrst sight; it says that it is obligated to do an impossible action if no action is allowed.
Actually, it only says that in this case any action will give us problems.
5. Spicing up DPL with time
We have deﬁned the basic logic, but if we want a good logic for specifying computing systems, the dimension of time is
needed. Several types of temporal logics have been used by computer scientists in recent decades. In this section we shall
introduce a Branching Time Logic; this logic is very similar to CTL (see [10]), that is, we allow temporal predicates combined
with quantiﬁers on paths. Although, CTL∗ logics are more expressive, they are much harder to axiomatize, as is shown
in [29]. We leave for further work a CTL∗ version of the logic presented here.
On the other hand, the temporalization shown below is an Okhamist logic since formulae are evaluated with respect
to an history and an instant, that is, we evaluate predicates using ﬁxed traces. This semantics allows us to introduce the
interesting predicate Done(), which can be used to predicate on the immediate past; this operator is mentioned in [25]
and [19], but here we offer an axiomatization with some new axioms, and we show that mixing it with temporal notions
allow us to express interesting properties. Other past operators are not described here, though the extension of the logic to
support these is immediate.
First, we will present some changes to the deﬁnitions given earlier to be able to introduce time in the language. Let us
deﬁne the modal formulae.
Deﬁnition 8 (Temporal formulae). Given a DPL vocabulary 〈Φ0,0〉, the set of temporal deontic formulae (ΦT ) is deﬁned as
follows:
• Φ ⊆ ΦT . That is, the formulae deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3 are temporal formulae.
• If α ∈ , then Done(α) ∈ ΦT .
• If ϕ,ψ ∈ ΦT and α ∈ , then (ϕ → ψ) ∈ ΦT , [α]ϕ ∈ ΦT and ¬ϕ ∈ ΦT .
• If ϕ,ψ ∈ ΦT , then AGϕ ∈ ΦT , ANϕ ∈ ΦT , A(ϕ U ψ) ∈ ΦT and E(ϕ U ψ) ∈ ΦT .
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is true at the next moment, AGϕ means in all executions ϕ is always true, A(ϕ1 U ϕ2) means for every possible execution ϕ1 is true
until ϕ2 becomes true and E(ϕ1 U ϕ2) says there exists some execution where ϕ1 is true until ϕ2 becomes true. As usual, using
these operators we can deﬁne their dual versions:
• AFϕ def⇐⇒ A(
 U ϕ).
• EFϕ def⇐⇒ ¬AG¬ϕ .
• ENϕ def⇐⇒ ¬AN¬ϕ .
For deﬁning the semantics of the temporal version of the logic, we need some changes to the structures considered, as well
as needing to introduce the deﬁnition of traces. Firstly, we deﬁne the notion of initial states, then all the possibles traces of
execution will be deﬁned with respect to an initial state.
Deﬁnition 9 (Temporal model). Given a language L = 〈Φ0,0〉, M = 〈W,R,E,I,P,w〉 is called a temporal structure, where:
• 〈W,R,E,I,P〉 is a structure as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.
• w ∈ W is the initial state.
Using the initial state we can consider all the traces (or paths) which start in this state.
Deﬁnition 10 (Traces). Given a model M = 〈W,R,E,I,P,w〉 a trace is a (labeled) path s0 e0→ s1 e1→ s2 e2→ ·· · , where for
every i: si
ei→ si+1 ∈ R, and s0 = w . The set of all traces on w is Σ(w).
Note that some paths could be ﬁnite; we use maximal traces (i.e., those traces which cannot be extended) to give
semantics to the temporal operators.
We need some additional notation; given an inﬁnite trace (or path) π = s0 e0→ s1 e1→ s2 e2→ ·· · , we denote by π i = si ei→
si+1
ei+1→ ·· · the subpath of π starting at position i. The notation πi = si is used to denote the ith element in the path, and
we write π [i, j] (where i  j) for the subpath si ei→ ·· ·
e j→ s j+1. Finally, given a ﬁnite path π ′ = s′0
e′0→ ·· · e
′
n→ sn+1, we say
π ′  π if π ′ is an initial subpath of π , that is: si = s′i and ei = e′i for 0 i  n, and we denote by ≺ the strict version of .
Deﬁnition 11 (Maximal traces). Given a structure M = 〈W,R,E,I,P,w〉, a trace π is called maximal if and only if there is
no other trace π ′ such that: π ≺ π ′ . The set of maximal traces is denoted by Σ∗(w). Note that all the inﬁnite traces are
maximal. We denote by #π the length of the trace π ; if it is inﬁnite we just use an abuse of notation and say #π = ∞.
The relation DTL is deﬁned using paths and structures, and an interesting point to note is that we also use a given
instant to evaluate formulae. It is needed here since the predicate Done(−) allows us to predicate about the immediate
past. Note that, in the following deﬁnition, we use the relation  deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.
Deﬁnition 12 (DTL). Given a model M = 〈W,R,E,I,P,w〉, a trace π = s0 e0→ s1 e1→ s2 e2→ ·· · ∈ Σ∗(w), we deﬁne the
relation DTL as follows:
• π, i,M DTL ϕ def⇐⇒ πi, 〈W,R,E,I,P〉  ϕ , if ϕ does not contain any temporal predicates.
• π, i,M DTL ¬ϕ def⇐⇒ not π, i,M DTL ϕ .
• π, i,M DTL ϕ1 → ϕ2 def⇐⇒ either not π, i,M DTL ϕ1 or π, i,M DTL ϕ2.
• π, i,M DTL Done(α) def⇐⇒ i > 0 and ei−1 ∈ I(α).
• π, i,M DTL [α]ϕ def⇐⇒ ∀π ′ = s′0
e′0→ s′1
e′1→ ·· · ∈ Σ∗(w) such that π [0, i] ≺ π ′ , if e′i ∈ I(α), then π ′, i + 1,M DTL ϕ .
• π, i,M DTL ANϕ def⇐⇒ if i = #π , then π, i,M  ϕ . If i = #π , then ∀π ′ ∈ Σ∗(w): π [0..i] ≺ π ′: π ′, i + 1,M  ϕ .
• π, i,M DTL AGϕ def⇐⇒ if i = #π , then π, i,M  ϕ . If i = #π , then ∀π ′ ∈ Σ∗(w): π [0..i] ≺ π ′ we have that ∀i  j 
#π ′: π ′, j,M  ϕ .
• π, i,M DTL A(ϕ1 U ϕ2) def⇐⇒ if i = #π , then π, i,M  ϕ2. If i = #π , then ∀π ′ ∈ Σ∗(w): π [0..i] ≺ π ′ we have that
∃i  j  #π ′: π ′, j,M  ϕ2 and ∀i  k j: π ′,k,M  ϕ .
• π, i,M DTL E(ϕ1 U ϕ2) def⇐⇒ if i = #π , then π, i,M  ϕ2. If i = #π , then ∃π ′ ∈ Σ∗(w): π [0..i] ≺ π ′ we have that
∃i  j  #π ′: π ′, j,M  ϕ2 and ∀i  k j: π ′,k,M  ϕ1.
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are kept through time.
We say that M DTL ϕ if π, i,M DTL ϕ for all paths π and instants i. And we say DTL ϕ if ϕ holds for all models M . This
notion of validity is not anchored (as deﬁned in [24]); in other words, we consider all the instants of a trace to say that
a given formula is satisﬁed by a path. Anchored temporal logics have some advantages and some drawbacks; we feel that,
for a simpler presentation of our ideas, a non-anchored logic is more convenient. Next, we present an axiomatic system for
the semantics just described; some axioms are the classic ones for CTL and the others allow us to exploit the relationship
between modal and temporal operators.
Deﬁnition 13 (DTL axioms). Given a vocabulary 〈Φ0,0〉, the axiomatic system is composed of the (substitution instances
of) the following axioms:
• All the axioms given in Deﬁnition 6.
TempAx1. 〈U〉
 → (ANϕ ↔ [U]ϕ).
TempAx2. [U]⊥ → (ANϕ ↔ ϕ).
TempAx3. AGϕ ↔ ¬E(
 U ¬ϕ).
TempAx4. E(ϕ U ψ) ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ENE(ϕ U ψ)).
TempAx5. A(ϕ U ψ) ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ANA(ϕ U ψ)).
TempAx6. [α]Done(α).
TempAx7. [α]¬Done(α).
TempAx8. ¬Done(∅).
TempAx9. ¬Done(U) → ¬Done(α).
And the following deduction rules:
• Rules given in Deﬁnition 6.
TempRule1. if  ¬Done(U) → ϕ and  ϕ → ANϕ , then  ϕ .
TempRule2. if  ϕ , then  AGϕ .
TempRule3. if  ϕ → (¬ψ ∧ ENϕ)}, then  ϕ → ¬A(ϑ U ψ).
TempRule4. if  ϕ → (¬ψ ∧ AN(ϕ ∨¬E(ϑ U ψ))), then  ϕ → ¬E(ϑ U ψ).
Some comments will be useful; note that the formula ¬Done(U) holds only at the beginning of each trace, and therefore
we can think of this as asserting that the actual instant is the beginning of time. Axioms TempAx1 and TempAx2 relate the
box modal operator with the temporal operators, reﬂecting the semantics introduced above. On the other hand, TempAx3–
TempAx5 are classic axioms for CTL logic (given in [10]). Axioms TempAx6–TempAx9 deﬁne the Done(−) operator, mainly
using the box modality. The ﬁrst inference rule is a kind of induction rule, saying: if something is true at the beginning of time,
and it is preserved by every action, we can deduce that it holds everywhere. Thus it enables us to establish invariants. The other
rules are standard for temporal logics.
We prove some useful theorems of this system. Note that, since the CTL system is embedded in the axiomatic system
given in Deﬁnition 13, we can derive all the CTL theorems; we only focus on the new ones. We prove some useful theorems
of this system.
Theorem 9. If  ¬Done(U) → ϕ and  ANϕ , then  ϕ .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Corollary 4. If  ¬Done(U) → ϕ and  ϕ → [U]ϕ , then  ϕ .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Both Theorem 9 and Corollary 4 are two different formulations of the induction principle TempRule1. The next theorem
allows us to characterize deadlock: when no action is enabled, we stay in this state forever. This property is established in [21]
as an axiom.
Theorem 10.  [U]⊥ ∧ ϕ → AN([U]⊥ ∧ ϕ).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Now, we can prove some important properties of the Done(−) operator.
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T13. Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′).
T14. Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β).
T15. Done(α 	 β) ↔ Done(α)∧ Done(β).
T16. Done(α unionsq β)∧ Done(α) → Done(β).
T17. [α]ϕ ∧ [β]Done(α) → [β]ϕ .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Note that since we include all the axioms of Deﬁnition 6 we have all the theorems proved in the other sections. Now,
we prove the soundness of the system given above.
Theorem 12. The axiomatic system is sound.
Proof. For the modal operators and the propositional part the proof is straightforward, just observing that the semantics is
exactly the same when a formula is evaluated. We give the proof for the novel axioms, the other are standard for temporal
logics.
TempAx1: Let M be a model, π = w0 e0→ w1 e1→ ·· · a (maximal) path and i a given instant, suppose: π, i,M  〈U〉
.
This means that: ∃w ′ ∈ W , ei ∈ E : wi ei→ w ′ . But from the semantics, we get that π, i,M  (ANϕ ↔ [U]ϕ) and
therefore: π, i,M  〈U〉
 → (ANϕ ↔ [U]ϕ).
TempAx2: If π, i,M  [U]⊥, then ei ∈ E,w ′ ∈ W : w ei→ w ′ , and therefore π [0..i] is a maximal trace, and #π = i. Using
the semantics of AN we get: π, i,M  ANϕ ↔ ϕ .
TempAx6: Suppose: π, i,M  [α]Done(α), i.e., ∃π ′: π [0..i] ≺ π ′ , where π ′ = w0 e0→ w1 e1→ ·· · ei−1→ wi ei→ w ′ with ei ∈ I(α),
and π ′, i + 1,M  Done(α) which is a contradiction.
TempAx7: Similar to TempAx6.
TempAx8: We have ∀e ∈ E : e /∈ ∅, and therefore π, i,M ¬Done(∅).
TempAx9: Suppose that π, i,M ¬Done(U), this fact implies that: i = 0 and from here we obtain: π, i,M ¬Done(α).
TempRule1: For every path π , the sentence ¬Done(U) → ϕ implies that ϕ must be true at instant 0, the other sentence
says that ϕ must be true in any other instant of π , and therefore π, i,M  ϕ . 
We leave the proof of completeness of this system as further work, we are investigating tableaux methods for the
deontic logic presented here, and possibly the completeness of the temporal extension of the logic may be proven using
similar techniques to the ones used in [15] and [9].
6. Tasting the logic: The diarrheic philosophers
Here we take the classical example of dining philosophers of Dijkstra [8], but we add some features to it, such that
every process has the possibility of crashing for an indeﬁnite amount of time. This modiﬁcation allows us to illustrate how
we can use our logic to reason about fault-tolerance. We have outlined this example in [5]; here we analyze in detail a
formalization of this problem, and we focus on proving some of its properties to show that the deductive system is usable
in practice.
The example allows us to show how the logic described in earlier sections can be used to specify a system, and moreover
to predicate about fault behavior, and fault tolerance. With this goal in mind, we exhibit some properties of the described
model, for example, that certain types of faults are more benign than other ones, in the sense that the ﬁrst kinds of fault
enable some type of progress, while the latter ones do not.
Example 1. In some college, a ﬁxed number of philosophers are dedicated to thinking about different problems. Because each
philosopher must eat to survive, the college has a (circular) table which contains a big bowl of pasta. Each philosopher has
a seat and two forks, one for each hand. But, because of budgetary reasons, neighboring philosophers have to share forks. In
addition, the pasta could be contaminated (usually philosophers think for a long time and so the pasta may develop some
dangerous bacteria, probably because they have to share forks!) and therefore philosophers could get a stomach ache and
then they must go to the bathroom. The problem, of course, is when a philosopher goes to the bathroom with some forks
in his hands. A philosopher may come back, or not, from the bathroom (the details are left to the reader’s imagination).
The main point to make about the following speciﬁcation is the way in which the possible faults (i.e., when a given
philosopher goes to the bathroom) are modeled. We model this scenario as a system violation; we will see that two
possible violations can be deﬁned. First, if a philosopher goes to the bathroom with two forks in his hands, this is obviously
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a philosopher only takes one fork with him (we use the predicate v2 to model this); in this case, we will prove that
undesirable blocking is not possible. Additionally, we will see that when violation v1 upgrades to a violation v2 the system
can avoid suffering some undesired blocking. Using this speciﬁcation, a very interesting set of properties can be proved,
some of which will be shown later.
Of course, we intend this speciﬁcation to be used in a broader context, where a given fault-tolerant program can be
checked against the given speciﬁcation and, therefore, we can deduce some program properties.
Firstly, the atomic predicates in our example are the following (for 0 i n):
Φ0 = {i.thk,i.eating,i.hungry,i.bath,i.hasL,i.hasR,forki.up,forki.down,i.v1,i.v2}
where i.eating tells us if philosopher i is eating, i.hungry if the philosopher is hungry, i.bath will be true
when i is in the bathroom, i.hasL and i.hasR allow us to know if i has the left or right fork in his hand. And
forki.up,forki.down will be true if fork i is up or down, respectively.
The primitive actions are the following:
0 = {i.upL,i.upR,i.downR,i.downL,i.getbad,i.getthk,i.gethungry}
Recall that 0 i n, for some n. Intuitively, i.upL (i.upR) is the action of philosopher i picking up the left (right) fork;
i.downL and i.downR are the inverses. On the other hand, i.getbad,i.getthk and i.gethungry are executed when
philosopher i gets sick, starts thinking or gets hungry, respectively.
We have several axioms, but note that many of them are frame axioms (i.e., they express which part of the system is
not changed by the actions, these requirements are usually implicit); stating these axioms can be avoided if a more abstract
language of speciﬁcation is used, and then translated to our logic.
Let us establish the initial conditions:
Phil1. ¬Done(U) →
( ∧
0in
i.thk
)
∧
( ∧
0in
forki.down
)
∧
( ∧
0in
¬i.v1 ∧¬i.v2
)
That is, in the initial state all the philosophers are thinking, all the forks are down and there are no violations. We also
need to express that some states are disjoint:
Phil2. forki.down  forki.up
Phil3. i.eating  i.thk  i.hungry  i.bath
Phil4. (i.thk∨ i.bath) → [i.upL unionsq i.upR]⊥
Here the symbol  denotes the strict version of ∨. Axiom Phil2 says that each fork can either be up or down but not both.
Phil3 is similar but expressing a disjointness condition on philosopher states. Phil4 says that a thinking or ill philosopher
cannot pick up any fork.
Phil5. ([i.upR]i.hasR)∧ ([i.upL]i.hasL)
∧ ([i.downR]¬i.hasR)∧ ([i.downL]¬i.hasL)
Phil6. (¬i.hasR → [i.upR]¬i.hasR)∧ (¬i.hasL → [i.upL]¬i.hasL)
(i.hasR → [i.downR]i.hasR)∧ (i.hasL → [i.downL]i.hasL)
∧ (¬i.hasL → [i.downL]⊥)∧ (¬i.hasR → [i.downR]⊥)
Phil7. (i.hasL → [i.getthk]Done(i.downL))
∧ (i.hasR → [i.getthk]Done(downR))
Phil8. ([i.getthk]i.thk)∧ (¬i.thk→ [i.getthk]¬i.thk)
The ﬁrst axiom models the behavior of the i.up and i.down actions. On the other hand, axiom Phil6 is a frame axiom; it
says that only the actions i.upL (i.downL) and i.upR (i.downR) can make that predicates i.hasL and i.hasR become
true (false). Phil7 and Phil8 are similar but they model the behavior of the i.getthk action.
Phil9. forki.up→ [i.upL unionsq (i+ 1).upR]⊥
Phil10. forki.up↔ ((i+ 1).hasR ∨ i.hasL)
Axiom Phil9 expresses that, if a fork is up, then none of the corresponding philosophers can take it (here “+” denotes
addition modulo n+ 1). The other formula establishes that a fork i is up if and only if the philosopher i, or i+ 1, has it
in his hands.
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expressed by the following axiom:
Phil11. i.upL 	 (i+ 1).upR = ∅
In an implementation, we should use a semaphore to ensure this requirement.
The next set of axioms models the behavior of the i.gethungry action.
Phil12. (i.gethungry 	 (i+ 1).gethungry) = ∅
Phil13. i.thk∧¬(i− 1).hungry∧¬(i+ 1).hungry
∧ forki.down∧ forki+1.down→ 〈i.gethungry〉

Phil14. (i.thk∧ (((i− 1).hungry∨ (i+ 1).hungry)
∨ ((i− 1).v1 ∧ i.hasL)∨ ((i+ 1).v1 ∧ i.hasR))) → [i.gethungry]⊥
Phil15. i.hungry∧ (forki.down∨ i.hasL)∧ (forki+1.down∨ i.hasR) → ANi.eating
Phil16. i.hungry∧ ((i+ 1).v1 ∧ (i+ 1).hasR)∧ ((i− 1).v1 ∧ (i− 1).hasL) → ANi.thk
Phil17. ([i.gethungry]i.hungry)∧ (¬i.hungry→ [i.gethungry]¬i.hungry)
The ﬁrst formula establishes that no two neighbor philosophers can get hungry at the same time; if we allow concurrency
here, it will give us some problems. Again some mechanism for mutual exclusion is needed in the implementation. Phil14
expresses that if some philosopher is getting hungry and some neighbor is already in that state, the philosopher has to
wait. Obviously, this speciﬁcation exhibits a starvation problem; to avoid this, a priority queue is needed. For simplicity, we
do not deal with this problem in this example.
Phil13 tells us when a philosopher will have the possibility of getting hungry. Axiom Phil15 says that if a philosopher
is hungry and he can take both forks, then he will start to eat. The last two axioms in this set specify the behavior of
i.gethungry and some frame conditions.
The following set of sentences specify what happens when a philosopher is eating,
Phil18. i.eating↔ (i.hasL ∧ i.hasR ∧¬i.bath)
Phil19. i.eating→ [i.upL unionsq i.upR unionsq i.getbetter unionsq i.gethungry]⊥
Phil20. i.eating→ [U]Done(i.getthk unionsq i.getbad)
Phil21. i.eating↔ O(i.downL 	 i.downR)
Axiom Phil18 says that a philosopher is eating iff he has both forks and he is not in the bathroom. Axiom Phil19 restricts
the actions that can be done when a philosopher is eating. Phil20 says, if a philosopher is eating, then he can only start
thinking again or getting sick. Of course, in a more complicated speciﬁcation philosophers might eat an undeﬁned amount
of time (here they only eat for one time unit). The amount of time that philosophers eat is not important for our present
purposes. The last axiom establishes an obligation about the release of the forks. Some explanation is needed about this
obligation; note that the deontic predicate here (Phil21) says what happens in ideally or normally, but perhaps this condi-
tion may be violated. The important point here is that the obligation predicate allows us to differentiate an ideal or normal
scenario from one that is not (note that O(α) → ¬Pw(α), where the negation of a weak permission can be read as a prohi-
bition), and this is a strong beneﬁt of deontic logic. Note also that these deontic restrictions will be reﬂected in the semantic
structures, where some arcs will be green colored (allowed transitions) and others red colored (forbidden transitions, e.g.,
when a philosopher does not put down the forks). This classiﬁcation of transitions allows us to perform different analyses
on the semantic models (e.g., to investigate properties that are preserved by green transitions).
The i.getbad action can be modeled as follows:
Phil22. ([i.getbad]i.bath)∧ (¬i.bath→ [i.getbad]¬i.bath)
Phil23. i.bath→ [i.getthk]i.bath
We note axiom Phil23, which says that if a philosopher gets better, then he goes to the thinking state (and therefore he has
to free those forks that he has in his hands).
Finally, we present a collection of axioms for modeling the notion of violation. The predicates i.v1,i.v2 are used for
this purpose; i.v1 becomes true when philosopher i (after eating) does not release both forks. i.v2 is a reﬁnement of
i.v1; it is true when philosopher i only releases one fork, but holds onto the remaining fork. These variables allow us to
reason about the situations in which an undesirable blocking becomes possible, because some norm has been violated (e.g.,
that in Phil21), and when we can avoid it (so-called recovery steps). Interestingly, we can predicate about recovery from
bad scenarios (for example, when i.v1 “upgrades” to i.v2). The axioms are:
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→ ([i.downL 	 i.downR]i.v1)∧ ([i.downL 	 i.downR]¬i.v1)
V2. ¬i.v1 ∧¬O(i.downL 	 i.downR) → [U]¬i.v1
V3. i.v2 ↔ i.v1 ∧ (¬i.hasL ¬i.hasR)
V4. (i.v1 → [i.downL 	 i.downR]¬i.v1)∧ (i.v1 ∧¬i.v2 → [i.downL 	 i.downR]i.v1)
V5. i.v2 → [i.downL unionsq i.downR]i.v2
V6. ((i.v2 ∧¬i.hasL) → [i.downR](¬i.v2 ∧¬i.v1))
∧ ((i.v2 ∧¬i.hasR) → [i.downR](¬i.v2 ∧¬i.v1))
The ﬁrst axiom deﬁnes when i.v1 can become true, that is, when philosopher i is obligated to put down both forks but
he does not do so; otherwise i.v1 is false. V2 is needed to say that the other actions do not affect the violation marker
i.v1 . V3 deﬁnes i.v2; it is true if and only if the philosopher has only one fork and violation i.v1 is true. Intuitively, this
occurs when a philosopher only takes one fork with him to the bathroom, or perhaps if he puts down a fork after getting
in a violation state. Note that it is possible for a philosopher to put down a fork while in the bathroom, although in this
model this philosopher will stay in the bathroom while he puts down a fork, there are no constraints in the speciﬁcation to
prevent this or to encourage it. (This may be considered an example of underspeciﬁcation.) We may be of the view that he
leaves the fork under the bathroom door and somebody will pick it up. (For the sake of simplicity we abstract these details
from our model.) V4 establishes that putting down both forks is a recovery action for i.v1 , and, if we are not in a violation
of type i.v2 , then doing something different will leave us in the same violation state. This has the important consequence
that, when we are in a violation of type i.v2 , we can recover from i.v1 and i.v2; exactly this is speciﬁed by axiom V6.
Note that the deontic part of the speciﬁcation is simple: we only have obligations when the philosophers are eating.
Of course, more complicated scenarios could be thought of; we can add a second obligation (a contrary-to-duty obligation)
when a philosopher is in the bathroom (e.g., to release at least one fork). As we said before, we keep our example as
simple as possible, and we just illustrate how the logic is used in practice. We only impose one obligation and describe how
violations follow when this obligation is not fulﬁlled.
On the other hand, axioms: V1 and V2 impose a relationship between violations and obligations. Although this relation-
ship is not as strong as the ones usually imposed in dynamic deontic logic, see Section 3, we argue that a weak relationship
is better in fault-tolerance (which is also noted by Sergot in [30]). For example, note that in each scenario we have a differ-
ent set of possible violations: v1, . . . , vn , and then we can deﬁne: V ≡ v1 ∨ · · · ∨ vn , and therefore a state free of violations
is one in which ¬V ≡ ¬v1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬vn is true. However, deﬁning, e.g., P(α) ≡ 〈α〉¬V is not always a good option: in the
example presented above a philosopher could be in the bathroom with the two forks (in a violation state), and with this
strong deﬁnition putting down only one fork is forbidden (not allowed) because the philosopher will still be in a violation
state. The point is that this situation is not desirable in our scenario: the action of putting down only one fork allows the
system to make some progress (allowing other philosophers to eat). As noted above, allowed actions, in a violation state,
could carry forward violations. More examples of this kind can be found in [30].
Note that the ggg condition (see Section 3) could be introduced as a speciﬁcation dependent axiom, i.e., it must be
instantiated in each speciﬁcation (in a similar way to the locality axioms, see [12]). The following schema deﬁnes the ggg
requirement:
¬V ∧ P(α) → [α]¬V .
Note that, with this axiom, formula V1 can be simpliﬁed. We leave for further work the investigation of this schema and
how it can be used in practice. Similarly, we are investigating the lattice-like logical structure of the scheme of violations
deﬁned by V ≡ v1 ∨ · · · ∨ vn .
6.1. Some properties
In this section, we will prove some important properties about the speciﬁcation given above. Firstly, we show some
important lemmas, which allow us to modularize the proofs. The proof for Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix A; here we
concentrate on the proofs of the main properties.
Our ﬁrst lemma establishes that no two neighboring philosophers can have the same fork at the same time.
Lemma 3. Phil ¬((i+ 1).hasR ∧ i.hasL).
The second lemma says that, if a philosopher is in a violation, then he has some fork in his hands:
Lemma 4. Phil i.v1 → (i.hasR ∨ i.hasL).
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not be in a violation or he will not be eating. That is, if a philosopher goes into a violation, then he cannot be eating.
Lemma 5. Phil ¬i.v1 → [U](¬i.v1 ∨¬i.eating).
The following lemma characterizes, in some way, the relationship between violations i.v1 and i.v2: if a philosopher is
in violation i.v1 and not in i.v2 (that is, he has both forks), then no neighboring philosopher of his can be eating.
Lemma 6. Phil i.v1 ∧¬i.v2 → ¬(i+ 1).eating∧¬(i− 1).eating.
The next lemma says that, if a philosopher is not eating, then in the next state he is not eating or he is not in a violation.
Lemma 7. Phil ¬i.eating→ [U](¬i.v1 ∨¬i.eating).
The following lemma tells us that, if a philosopher is in a violation, then he cannot be eating.
Lemma 8. Phil i.v1 → ¬i.eating.
It seems obvious that, if a philosopher is in a violation, then he is in the bathroom; the following lemma formalizes this
intuition.
Lemma 9. Phil i.v1 → i.bath.
If a philosopher is thinking, then he has neither the right fork nor the left fork.
Lemma 10. Phil i.thk→ ¬i.hasL ∧¬i.hasR .
No two neighbors can be hungry at the same time.
Lemma 11. Phil ¬i.hungry∨¬(i+ 1).hungry.
Suppose that a philosopher i+ 1 is in a violation v2 , but he does not have the right fork in his hands, and, in addition,
philosophers i and i− 1 are not in the bathroom, i is hungry and i− 1 is thinking, then there exists the possibility for i
to eat in the future. This fact is expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma12.Phil AG(((i+ 1).v2∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bathroom∧¬(i− 1).bathroom)∧i.hungry∧(i− 1).thinking
→ EFi.eating.
The next lemma is a variation of the above lemma.
Lemma 13. Phil AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧ ¬(i+ 1).hasR) ∧ ¬i.bathroom ∧ ¬(i− 1).bathroom) ∧ i.thinking ∧ (i− 1).
thinking→ EFi.eating.
Now, we have the same scenario as before, but, if (i− 1) is eating, then i will have the possibility of eating.
Lemma 14. Phil AG(((i+ 1).v2∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bathroom∧¬(i− 1).bathroom)∧ (i.thinking∨i.hungry)∧
(i− 1).eating→ EFi.eating.
Finally, we have the following variation of the above lemma.
Lemma 15. Phil AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧ ¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧ ¬i.bathroom∧ ¬(i− 1).bathroom)∧ i.thk∧ (i− 1).hungry→
EFi.eating.
At this point we are ready to prove the ﬁrst important property: if philosopher i is always in violation i.v1 , but not in
violation i.v2 , then none of his neighbors can eat.
Property 1. Phil AG(i.v1 ∧¬i.v2) → AG(¬i.eating∧¬(i+ 1).eating∧¬(i− 1.eating)).
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1. i.v1 → ¬i.eating Lemma 8
2. AG(i.v1) → AG(¬i.eating) CTL,1
3. i.v1 ∧¬i.v2 →
¬(i+ 1).eating∧¬(i− 1).eating Lemma 6
4. AG(i.v1 ∧¬i.v2) →
AG(¬(i+ 1).eating∧¬(i− 1).eating) CTL,3
5. AG(i.v1 ∧¬i.v2) →
AG(¬i.eating∧¬(i+ 1).eating∧¬(i− 1).eating) CTL,2,4 
Now, we will prove that a violation i.v2 is less dangerous than a violation i.v1 ∧ ¬i.v2 , in the sense that the ﬁrst
type of violation allows neighbors to progress in some cases. Suppose that a philosopher goes to the bathroom with the left
fork, then his right neighbor is free to take his left fork (the right fork of the philosopher who has gone to the bathroom);
moreover, he will be lucky in the sense that his left neighbor does not compete anymore for that resource. In addition, if
the right neighbor of the lucky philosopher will not go to the bathroom, then we can ensure that the lucky philosopher will
have the possibility of eating in the future.
Property 2. Phil AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath) → EFi.eating.
Proof.
1. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.thinking∧ (i− 1).thinking→ EFi.eating Lemma 13
2. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.hungry∧ (i− 1).thinking→ EFi.eating Lemma 12
3. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.thk∧ (i− 1).hungry→ EFi.eating Lemma 15
4. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.hungry∧ (i− 1).eating→ EFi.eating PL, Lemma 14
5. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.thk∧ (i− 1).eating→ EFi.eating PL, Lemma 14
6. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
∧i.eating→ EFi.eating CTL
7. i.eating  i.bath  i.hungry  i.thk Phil3
8. (i− 1).eating  (i− 1).bath  (i− 1).hungry  (i− 1).thk Phil3
9. ¬(i.hungry∧ (i− 1).hungry)∧¬(i.eating∧ (i− 1).eating) Lemmas 3 and 11
10. AG(((i+ 1).v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i− 1).bath)
→ EFi.eating CTL,1–9 
The proof of this property is sketched; the idea behind it is to analyze the possible states of the philosophers involved
using lines 7, 8 and 9, and then by lines 1–6 we can prove that in each possible scenario the property is true, and the result
follows.
Note that we cannot ensure that philosopher i will always eat, because this depends on fair scheduling. If we add some
kind of fairness restriction to our speciﬁcation, then we are able to prove it.
Obviously, we can prove the symmetric case.
Property 3. Phil AG(((i− 1).v2 ∧¬(i− 1).hasL)∧¬i.bath∧¬(i+ 1).bath) → EFi.eating.
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Corollary 5. Phil AG(i.v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).bath∧¬(i− 1).bath∧¬(i+ 2).bath∧¬(i− 2).bath) → EF((i− 1).eating∨
(i+ 1).eating).
Proof.
1. i.v2 → ¬i.hasL ¬i.hasR V3
2. AG(i.v2 ∧¬i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).bath∧¬(i+ 2).bath) →
EF((i+ 1).eating) Property 3
3. AG(i.v2 ∧¬i.hasR ∧¬(i− 1).bath∧¬(i− 2).bath) →
EF((i− 1).eating) Property 2
4. AG(i.v2 ∧ (¬i.hasR ¬i.hasL)∧¬(i− 1).bath∧
¬ (i+ 1).bath∧¬(i+ 2).bath∧¬(i− 2).bath) →
EF((i+ 1).eating)∨ EF((i− 1).eating) PL&CTL,2,3
5. AG(i.v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).bath∧¬(i− 1).bath
∧¬(i+ 2).bath∧¬(i− 2).bath)
→ EF((i+ 1).eating∨ (i− 1).eating) CTL,1,4 
Imposing fairness restrictions (i.e., if a philosopher has an unbounded number of times the possibility of eating, he will
eat an unbounded number of times) we should be able to prove the following property:
AG(i.v2 ∧¬(i+ 1).bath∧¬(i− 1).bath∧¬(i+ 2).bath∧¬(i− 2).bath)
→ AF((i− 1).eating∨ (i+ 1).eating)
That is, in case of a v2 violation, one of the two neighbors will eventually eat. We leave this property for future work.
Finally, if we consider the CTL property:
(AGp → EFq) → (A(r U AGp) → EFq)
then we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5:
Corollary 6. Phil A(i.v1 U AGi.v2) ∧ AG(¬(i+ 1).bath ∧ ¬(i− 1).bath ∧ ¬(i+ 2).bath ∧ ¬(i− 2).bath) →
EF((i− 1).eating∨ (i+ 1).eating).
This says that, if a violation v1 upgrades to a violation of type v2 (for example, if the philosopher puts down a fork),
then at least one of the two neighbors will have the possibility of eating in the future.
7. Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have presented the main characteristics of a new deontic logic. We have illustrated this framework
using a variation of the dining philosophers problem. By means of this example we have shown how concepts like the
occurrence of faults and fault-recovery can be formalized using the formalism introduced above.
The propositional part of the logic described in earlier sections has interesting metaproperties, e.g., soundness, complete-
ness and compactness. The fact that we use boolean operators on actions gives us an appealing expressive power. In addition,
a strong connection between two different versions of permission was shown. The decision methods for this logic are being
investigated more deeply, using a tableaux method, also extending to the temporal version of the logic, which, in addition,
will allows us to prove the completeness of the temporal extension of the logic. This would enable us to implement a model
ﬁnder. On the other hand, the utilization of the ggg constraint as a parameterized axiom may simplify proofs and speciﬁ-
cations, a deeper investigation about how this axiom could be used in practice (with this logic) seems to be an interesting
further work.
Moreover, modularizing speciﬁcations is a successful technique to reduce the complexity of logical speciﬁcations; inter-
esting further work would extend the formalism described above to be able to deal with modules and relationships between
them. How the deontic operators are affected by modularity seems to be a key problem here. We may extend the ideas
of [12] where category theory is used to deﬁne the connection between components, but yet we need to distribute the
deontic operators; e.g., perhaps a component is in a violation but this does not imply that there is a global violation, and
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work.
Finally, we want to extend this logic with ﬁrst-order operators; this will give us a more expressive framework and it will
allow us to present more interesting examples. However, it seems likely that some meta-properties (e.g., compactness) will
be lost in such an extension.
Appendix A. Additional proofs
In this section we provide proofs of many theorems and properties given in the paper.
Proof of Theorem 4.
T1:
1. P(α) → P(α 	 α′) Axiom A8
2. α′ =act α 	 α′ ∧ P(α) → P(α 	 α′) PL,1
3. α′ =act α 	 α′ ∧ P(α 	 α′) → P(α′) BA & PL
4. α′ =act α 	 α′ ∧ P(α) → P(α′) PL,2,3
T2: Similar to T1 but using axiom A10.
T3: Similar to T1 but using axiom A5.
T4:
1. [α]ϕ → [α](ϕ ∨ψ) ML
2. [α′]ψ → [α′](ϕ ∨ψ) ML
3. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α](ϕ ∨ψ)∧ [α′](ϕ ∨ψ) PL,1,2
4. [α](ϕ ∨ψ)∧ [α′](ϕ ∨ψ) → [α unionsq α′](ϕ ∨ψ) ML, A4,3
5. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α unionsq α′](ϕ ∨ψ) PL,3,4
T5:
1. [α]ϕ → [α 	 α′]ϕ A5
2. [α′]ψ → [α 	 α′]ψ A5
3. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α 	 α′]ϕ ∧ [α 	 α′]ψ PL,1,2
4. [α]ϕ ∧ [α′]ψ → [α 	 α′](ϕ ∧ψ) ML,3 
Proof of Theorem 9. Suppose:  ¬Done(U) → ϕ and  ANϕ , then:
1. ANϕ Hyp.
2. ϕ → ANϕ PL,1
Therefore using TempRule1 we get:  ϕ . 
Proof of Corollary 4. We suppose  ¬Done(U) → ϕ and  ϕ → [U]ϕ; then we prove that 〈U〉
  ϕ → ANϕ and [U]⊥ 
ϕ → ANϕ , and therefore by the deduction theorem we get  ϕ → ANϕ . Finally, using TempRule1 we get:  ϕ .
Case 1: 〈U〉
  ϕ → ANϕ
1. 〈U〉
 Assumption
2. ANϕ ↔ [U]ϕ PL,1,TempAx1, TempAx2
3. ϕ → ANϕ PL, Hyp,2
Case 2: [U]⊥  ϕ → ANϕ
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2. ANϕ ↔ ϕ TempAx2
3. ϕ → ANϕ PL,2 
Proof of Theorem 10.
1. [U]⊥ → (ANϕ ↔ ϕ) TempAx2
2. [U]⊥ ∧ ϕ → ANϕ PL,1
3. [U]⊥ → ((AN[U]⊥) ↔ [U]⊥) TempAx2
4. [U]⊥ → AN[U]⊥ PL,3
5. [U]⊥ ∧ ϕ → (AN[U]⊥ ∧ ANϕ) PL,2,4
6. [U]⊥ ∧ ϕ → AN([U]⊥ ∧ ϕ) PL, CTL property 
Proof of Theorem 11. T13: We use Corollary 4 for proving this property (which can be though of as an induction).
Base case
1. ¬Done(U) → (¬Done(α)∧¬Done(α′)) PL&TempAx9
2. ¬Done(U) → (¬Done(α′) → ¬Done(α)) PL,1
3. ¬Done(U) → (Done(α) → Done(α′)) PL,2
4. ¬Done(U) → (Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′)) PL,3
Ind. case. Suppose: α  α′ .
1. [α]Done(α) TempAx6
2. [α′]Done(α′) TempAx6
3. [α]Done(α)∧ [α′]Done(α′) → [α 	 α′](Done(α)∧ Done(α′)) T5
4. [α 	 α′](Done(α)∧ Done(α′)) MP,1,2,3
5. [α′]Done(α′)∧ α  α′ → [α]Done(α′) T3
6. α  α′ Assumption
7. [α]Done(α′) PL,2,5,6
8. [α]Done(α′) → [α](Done(α) → Done(α′)) ML
9. [α](Done(α) → Done(α′)) MP,7,8
10. [α]¬Done(α) TempAx7
11. [α](¬Done(α)∨ Done(α′)) ML, PL,10
12. [α](Done(α) → Done(α′)) ML, PL,11
13. [α](Done(α) → Done(α′))∧ [α](Done(α) → Done(α′))
→ [α unionsq α](Done(α) → Done(α′)) T4
14. [α unionsq α](Done(α) → Done(α′)) PL,9,12,13
15. [U](Done(α) → Done(α′)) BA,14
16. (Done(α) → Done(α′))∧ α  α′ → [U](Done(α) → Done(α′)) PL,15
17. (Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′))
→ [U](Done(α)∧ α′  α → Done(α′)) PL,16
We have proved
α ⊆ α′  Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′) → [U](Done(α)∧ α′  α → Done(α′))
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 ¬α  α′ → ((Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′)) → [U](Done(α)∧ α′  α → Done(α′)))
using the deduction metatheorem and propositional logic we get the result. The proof is as follows.
1. ¬α  α′ → [U]¬α  α′ PL, A17,def. 
2. ¬α  α′ → (Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′)) PL
3. [U]¬α  α′ → [U](Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′)) ML,2
4. ¬α  α′ → [U](Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′)) PL,1,3
5. ¬α  α′ →
Done(α)∧ α  α′ → Done(α′) →
[U](Done(α)∧ α′  α → Done(α′) PL,4 
T14: We use Corollary 4:
Base case
1. ¬Done(U) → ¬Done(α unionsq β) TempAx9
2. ¬Done(U) → ((¬Done(α)∧¬Done(β)) → ¬Done(α unionsq β)) PL,1
3. ¬Done(U) → (Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β)) PL,2
Ind. case
1. [α unionsq β]Done(α unionsq β) TempAx6
2. [α]Done(α) TempAx6
3. [β]Done(β) TempAx6
4. [α]Done(α)∧ [β]Done(β) → [α unionsq β](Done(α)∨ Done(β)) T4
5. [α unionsq β](Done(α)∨ Done(β)) PL,2,3,4
6. [α unionsq β](Done(α)∨ Done(β)) → [α unionsq β](Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β)) ML
7. [α unionsq β](Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β)) MP,5,6
8. [α unionsq β]¬Done(α unionsq β) TempAx7
9. [α unionsq β](Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β)) ML, PL,8
10. [U](Done(α unionsq β) → Done(α)∨ Done(β)) BA&A4,9,7
T15: (→):
1. Done(α 	 β)∧ α 	 β  α → Done(α) T13
2. α 	 β  α Def. 
3. Done(α 	 β) → Done(α) PL,1,2
4. Done(α 	 β)∧ α 	 β  β → Done(β) T13
5. α 	 β  β Def. 
6. Done(α 	 β) → Done(β) PL,4,5
7. Done(α 	 β) → Done(α)∧ Done(β) PL,3,6
(←): By induction:
Base case
1. ¬Done(U) → ¬Done(α) TempAx9
2. ¬Done(U) → (Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) PL,1
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1. [α]Done(α)∧ α 	 β  α → [α 	 β]Done(α) T3
2. [α]Done(α) TempAx6
3. α 	 β  α Def. 
4. [α 	 β]Done(α) PL,1,2,3
5. [β]Done(β) TempAx6
6. [β]Done(β)∧ α 	 β  β → [α 	 β]Done(β) T3
7. α 	 β  β Def. 
8. [α 	 β]Done(β) PL,5,6,7
9. [α 	 β]Done(α 	 β) TempAx6
10. [α 	 β]Done(α 	 β) → [α 	 β](Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) ML
11. [α 	 β](Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) MP,10,8,4
12. [α]¬Done(α) TempAx7
13. [β]¬Done(β) TempAx7
14. [α unionsq β](¬Done(α)∨¬Done(β)) PL&T4,12,13
15. [α 	 β]¬(Done(α)∧ Done(β)) ML, PL,BA,14
16. [α 	 β](Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) PL&ML,15
17. [U](Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) PL, A4,BA,11,16
18. (Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) →
[U](Done(α)∧ Done(β) → Done(α 	 β)) PL,17
T16:
1. Done(α unionsq β)∧ Done(α) → Done((α unionsq β) 	 α) T15
2. Done(α unionsq β)∧ Done(α) → Done(β) PL, BA,1,T13
T17:
1. β 	 α  β ∧ [β]Done(α) → [β 	 α]Done(α) T3
2. β 	 α  α ∧ [α]¬Done(α) → [β 	 α]¬Done(α) T3
3. [β 	 α]¬Done(α) PL,2,TempAx7&def. 
4. [β]Done(α) → [β 	 α]Done(α) PL,1&def. 
5. [β]Done(α) → [β 	 α]Done(α)∧ [β 	 α]¬Done(α) PL,3,4
6. [β]Done(α) → [β 	 α]⊥ ML,5
7. [β]Done(α) → [β 	 α]ϕ ML,6
8. β 	 α  α ∧ [α]ϕ → [β 	 α]ϕ T3
9. [α]ϕ → [β 	 α]ϕ PL,8, def.
10. [β]Done(α)∧ [α]ϕ → [β 	 α]ϕ ∧ [β 	 α]ϕ PL,9,7
11. [β]Done(α)∧ [α]ϕ → [(β 	 α) unionsq (β 	 α)]ϕ PL,T4,10
12. [β]Done(α)∧ [α]ϕ → [β]ϕ PL,BA,11 
Proof of Lemma 3. We use induction to prove it.
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1. ¬Done(U) → forki.down PL, Phil1
2. ¬Done(U) → (¬i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR) PL,1,Phil2, Phil10
3. ¬Done(U) → (¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1).hasR) PL,2
Ind. case
1. ¬(i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [(i+ 1).upR](i+ 1).hasR PL, Phil5
2. i.upL 	 (i+ 1).upR = ∅ Phil11
3. (i+ 1).upR  i.upL BA,2
4. ¬i.hasL → [i.upL]¬i.hasL PL, Phil6
5. [i.upL]¬i.hasL → [i+ 1.upR]¬i.hasL PL,T3,3
6. ¬i.hasL → [i+ 1.upR]¬i.hasL PL,4,5
7. ¬(i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [(i+ 1).upR]((i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL) ML,6,1
8. ¬i.hasL → [i.upL]i.hasL PL, Phil5
9. i.upL  i+ 1.upR BA,2
10. ¬(i+ 1).hasR → [(i+ 1).upR]¬(i+ 1).hasL PL, Phil6
11. [(i+ 1).upR]¬(i+ 1).hasR → [i.upL]¬(i+ 1).hasL PL,T3,9
12. ¬(i+ 1).hasR → [i.upL]¬(i+ 1).hasR PL,10,11
13. ¬(i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [i.upL](¬(i+ 1).hasR ∧ i.hasL) PL,12,8
14. ¬(i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL →
[i.upL unionsq (i+ 1).upR](¬(i+ 1).hasR ∨¬i.hasL) PL,T4,6,12
15. ¬i.hasL → [i.upL]¬i.hasL PL, Phil6
16. ¬(i+ 1).hasR → [(i+ 1).upR]¬(i+ 1).hasR PL, Phil6
17. ¬i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR →
[i.upL unionsq (i+ 1).upR](¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1).hasR) PL,T4,15,16
18. ¬i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [U](¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1).hasR) PL,BA,T4,14,17
19. i.hasL → forki.up PL, Phil10
20. forki.up→ [(i+ 1).upR]⊥ PL, Phil9,T3
21. i.hasL → [(i+ 1).upR]⊥ PL,19,20
22. forki.up→ [i.upL]⊥ PL, Phil9,T3
23. i.hasL → [i.upL]⊥ PL,19,22
24. i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [(i+ 1).upR]⊥ PL,21
25. ⊥ → ¬(i+ 1).hasR PL
26. i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [(i+ 1).upR]¬(i+ 1).hasR ML,24,25
27. i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [(i+ 1).upR]¬(i+ 1).hasR PL,16
28. ¬(i+ 1).hasR → ¬(i+ 1).hasR ∨¬i.hasL PL
29. i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [U]¬(i+ 1).hasR PL, BA,26,27,T4
30. i.hasL ∧¬(i+ 1).hasR → [U](¬(i+ 1).hasR ∨¬i.hasL) ML&PL,28,29
31. (i+ 1).hasR → forki.up ML&PL, Phil10
32. (i+ 1).hasR → [i.upL]⊥ PL, Phil9,31,T3
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34. (i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [i.upL]¬i.hasL PL,15
35. (i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [i.upL](¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1).hasR) ML&PL,34
36. (i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [i.upL](¬i.hasL ∨ (i+ 1).hasR) ML&PL,33
37. (i+ 1).hasR ∧¬i.hasL → [U](¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1),hasR) BA, PL,36,35,T4
38. (¬(i+ 1).hasR ∨¬i.hasL) → [U](¬i.hasL ∨¬(i+ 1).hasR) PL,18,30,37 
The other lemmas can be proven in a similar way, using the induction rule.
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